"Our message is that mandatory registration and
mass surveillance are not the answers to the problem of terrorism,
and not a road that any nation should be heading down. What is
needed is good intelligence on specific threats – not the so-called
'risk-profiling' of entire populations and the generation of more
information than can possibly be usefully analysed," said Tony
Bunyan, Director of Statewatch.
"There is a real danger that in trying to watch everyone you are
actually watching no-one," he added.
The campaign members include Statewatch and the American Civil
Liberties Union (
ACLU
), backed by around 100 civil
liberties groups and non-governmental organisations around the
world.
To highlight the issue,
ICAMS
yesterday published a
report, "The emergence of a global infrastructure for registration
and surveillance."
The report states:
"The questions we all should be asking our governments are
these: is general and pervasive surveillance an
effective response to terrorism? Is it proportionate to
the real risk posed by terrorists? Will it destroy the very
democratic societies it is supposed to be protecting and entrench
the kind of corrupt, oppressive regimes that breed fanatical
opposition and terrorism?"
The report sets out 10 "signposts" that show how far down the
road towards a global surveillance infrastructure we have already
travelled.
These include familiar initiatives such as the introduction of
biometrics into
ID
cards – due to be implemented in
respect of EU passports by 2007 – and the collection and exchange
of passenger data (
PNR
), such as occurs in respect of
air passengers currently travelling from Europe to the US.
The report also highlights:
- The registration of populations – through, for example, the
US
VISIT programme, the
EU
Visa
Information System and the construction of national databases.
- The creation of an infrastructure for the global surveillance
of electronic communications and financial transactions – through
mandatory data retention regimes and new laws on police access to
private sector information. For example, in the draft
EU
framework decision on mandatory data
retention.
- The convergence of national and international databases. For
example, the EU's second-generation Schengen Information System
(known as
SIS II
), which enables enforcement agencies
throughout Europe to have access to a database of reports on
individuals and objects, such as cars, for border control purposes,
internal police checks and in some cases for the purpose of issuing
visas, residence permits and administrating persons that the system
defines as aliens.
- The spread of the "Risk Assessment" model: through "risk
profiling", "terrorist profiling" and "data mining," everyone is a
suspect; but it is increasingly difficult for innocent people who
maybe labeled as a "security risk" to challenge this.
- Security-force integration and the loss of sovereign checks and
balances: international mutual legal assistance (
MLA
)
agreements, joint investigation teams and the exchange of data
across national borders are not subject to adequate safeguards. The
EU has entered into three such treaties with the
US
(
MLA
, Europol and
PNR
).
- The corporate security complex: technological advance and the
climate of fear engendered by 9/11 is putting profit and security
above civil liberties and privacy concerns.
- The erosion of democratic values: in developing global
surveillance policies governments are removing judicial oversight
of law enforcement agents and public officials, circumventing
democratic oversight and debate by "policy laundering" and
disregarding privacy and data protection law. This is part of a
broader assault on due process in the criminal justice system.
- Rendition, torture, death: the loss of moral compass on the
part of the
US
and other countries that hold
themselves out as defenders of human rights as they have begun to
embrace inhumane and exceptional practices of social control.
The report is particularly concerned that many of these
liberties-sensitive security policies are being developed through
international organisations, rather than through normal legislative
routes.
A separate project to monitor these developments has already
been launched by the ACLU, Statewatch and the
UK
's
Privacy International. Speaking last week,
Dr.
Gus Hosein, Senior Fellow with Privacy
International, explained:
"This is the strategy we call policy laundering. The
UK
has recently laundered communications surveillance
policies through the European Union and
ID
cards
through the United Nations. The Government returns home to
Parliament, holding their hands up saying 'We are obliged to act
because of international obligations' and gets what they want with
little debate.
"The
UK
is not alone. This is a common practice for
the
US
and across Europe. The practice spreads also to
anti-terrorism policies in Asia and the Asian-Pacific. Governments
are going global, and so must we."
