Civil liberties groups unite against a surveillance society

"Our message is that mandatory registration and mass surveillance are not the answers to the problem of terrorism, and not a road that any nation should be heading down. What is needed is good intelligence on specific threats – not the so-called 'risk-profiling' of entire populations and the generation of more information than can possibly be usefully analysed," said Tony Bunyan, Director of Statewatch.

"There is a real danger that in trying to watch everyone you are actually watching no-one," he added.

The campaign members include Statewatch and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), backed by around 100 civil liberties groups and non-governmental organisations around the world.

To highlight the issue, ICAMS yesterday published a report, "The emergence of a global infrastructure for registration and surveillance."

The report states:

"The questions we all should be asking our governments are these: is general and pervasive surveillance an effective response to terrorism? Is it proportionate to the real risk posed by terrorists? Will it destroy the very democratic societies it is supposed to be protecting and entrench the kind of corrupt, oppressive regimes that breed fanatical opposition and terrorism?"

The report sets out 10 "signposts" that show how far down the road towards a global surveillance infrastructure we have already travelled.

These include familiar initiatives such as the introduction of biometrics into ID cards – due to be implemented in respect of EU passports by 2007 – and the collection and exchange of passenger data (PNR), such as occurs in respect of air passengers currently travelling from Europe to the US.

The report also highlights:

• The registration of populations – through, for example, the US VISIT programme, the EU Visa Information System and the construction of national databases.
• The creation of an infrastructure for the global surveillance of electronic communications and financial transactions – through mandatory data retention regimes and new laws on police access to private sector information. For example, in the draft EU framework decision on mandatory data retention.
• The convergence of national and international databases. For example, the EU's second-generation Schengen Information System (known as SIS II), which enables enforcement agencies throughout Europe to have access to a database of reports on individuals and objects, such as cars, for border control purposes, internal police checks and in some cases for the purpose of issuing visas, residence permits and administrating persons that the system defines as aliens.
• The spread of the "Risk Assessment" model: through "risk profiling", "terrorist profiling" and "data mining," everyone is a suspect; but it is increasingly difficult for innocent people who maybe labeled as a "security risk" to challenge this.
• Security-force integration and the loss of sovereign checks and balances: international mutual legal assistance (MLA) agreements, joint investigation teams and the exchange of data across national borders are not subject to adequate safeguards. The EU has entered into three such treaties with the US (MLA, Europol and PNR).
• The corporate security complex: technological advance and the climate of fear engendered by 9/11 is putting profit and security above civil liberties and privacy concerns.
• The erosion of democratic values: in developing global surveillance policies governments are removing judicial oversight of law enforcement agents and public officials, circumventing democratic oversight and debate by "policy laundering" and disregarding privacy and data protection law. This is part of a broader assault on due process in the criminal justice system.
• Rendition, torture, death: the loss of moral compass on the part of the US and other countries that hold themselves out as defenders of human rights as they have begun to embrace inhumane and exceptional practices of social control.

The report is particularly concerned that many of these liberties-sensitive security policies are being developed through international organisations, rather than through normal legislative routes.

A separate project to monitor these developments has already been launched by the ACLU, Statewatch and the UK's Privacy International. Speaking last week, Dr. Gus Hosein, Senior Fellow with Privacy International, explained:

"This is the strategy we call policy laundering. The UK has recently laundered communications surveillance policies through the European Union and ID cards through the United Nations. The Government returns home to Parliament, holding their hands up saying 'We are obliged to act because of international obligations' and gets what they want with little debate.

"The UK is not alone. This is a common practice for the US and across Europe. The practice spreads also to anti-terrorism policies in Asia and the Asian-Pacific. Governments are going global, and so must we."